Michigan Law Review
Volume 37

Issue 1

1938

TORTS - UNFAIR COMPETITION - PREVENTING FORMATION OF
CONTRACT
Anthony L. Dividio
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony L. Dividio, TORTS - UNFAIR COMPETITION - PREVENTING FORMATION OF CONTRACT, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 115 (1938).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/10

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1938 ]

TORTS

COMMENTS

UNFAIR COMPETITION -

-

. 1

5

PREVENTING FORMATION OF

The Supreme Court of Minnesota was recently confronted with an interesting problem in the case of Johnson v.Gustafson.' Real property was listed by the owner with the plaintiff, a real
estate broker, who was to receive a $300 commission if she found a
purchaser therefor. The plaintiff interested one Clarity in the property,
but no offer to purchase was made. Desiring the property but being
unwilling to pay the full price of $6,ooo, Clarity induced his friend
Gustafson to purchase it for $5,700 with Clarity's money, directly from
the owner, who had a right to sell it himself despite the listing.
Gustafson fraudulently represented that he did not know the plaintiff
or any of her customers, and that he was purchasing for himself. The
scheme uncovered, plaintiff sued both Clarity and Gustafson for damages in tort. It was held that the plaintiff had stated a good cause of
action since she would have earned her commission had it not been for
the fraudulent acts of the defendent'
CONTRACT

-

I.

Lftmley v. Gye' established the doctrine that malicious interference
by a third person inducing the breach of a contract for personal services
is actionable. However, due to the broad statements of law and policy

2

The holding will be discussed further infra, when compared with analogous cases.

3 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
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therein contained, the doctrine was soon expanded to include contracts
of all types, so that today it is almost universally conceded to apply
generally, with no restrictions based on the nature of the contract."
An early prediction in this country of the importance and difficulty of
the doctrine has amply confirmed itself not so much as regards the
applications of -thedoctrine to similar cases, as in the attempt at its further expansion.' The gist of the doctrine is that the right to perform
a contract and to reap the profits therefrom, and the right to have performance rendered by the other party, are property rights.6
While much contrariety of opinion exists as to the exact nature of
the malice which it is said must accompany the interference in order
to give rise to a cause of action, it may be safely concluded that malice
in the sense of ill-will or spite towards the plaintiff, while sufficient, is
no longer necessary. The word has come to acquire rather a meaning
of wrongful or unjustifiable interference! Indeed, it has been suggested
that the word malice has lost all meaning in this connection and that
the more exact gist of the action consists in wrongfully depriving the
plaintiff of "promised advantages." ' The necessary elements for the
application of the doctrine of Limley v. Gye may be summarized as
follows: There must be found (I) the existence of a valid contract,'
although not necessarily an enforceable contract,"0 (9) knowledge of
' Templeton v. Russell, [1893] I Q. B. 715; cases collected by Sayre, "Inducing
Breach of Contract," 36 HARv. L. RBEv. 663 (1923).
SBohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119 (1893).
6 Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARv. L. REV. 663 at 700 (1923),
Burden v. Elling State Bank, 76 Mont. 24, 245 P. 958 (1926); Bacon v. St. Paul
Union Stockyards Co., 161 Minn. 522, 201 N. W. 326 (1924); Lamb v. S. Cheney
& Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 1±5 N. E. 817 (i92o); R. & W. Hat Shop, Inc. v. Sculley,
98 Conn. I, 119 A. 55 (1922); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 6o3
(19o5); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. I, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); Hill
Grocery Co. v. Carroll, 223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931); J. C. McFarland Co.
v. O'Brien, (D. C. Ohio 1925) 6 F. (2d) ioi6; Second Nat. Bank v. M. Samuels
& Sons, (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 963, cert. den. 273 U. S. 720, 47 S. Ct.
11O (1926); 8 4 A. L. R. 46 (1933).
7 Bitterman v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 U. S. 205, 28 S. Ct. 91 (1907);
E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 205 Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85, 238 N. W. 626
(1931); Sorensen v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 24 N. W. 754 (1927);
Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 A. 165 (19o6); Evans v. McKay,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 212 S. W. 68o; COOLEY, TORTS, Throckmorton ed., § 367
(1930); HARPER, Tois, § 232 (I933).
" Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARv. L. REv. 663 (1923). See
Grismore, "Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?" 33 MIcH. L. REV. 321 (935);

Holmes, "Privilege, Malice and Intent," 8

HARv. L. REv. I (1894).
' The contract must be valid. Cases collected, 84 A. L. R. 43 at 48 (I933).
10 A contract may be valid, in the sense that it is not illegal, although unenforceable against the other party to it because of formal defects, Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga.
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the contract by the third party defendant, (3) malice in one of the
senses suggested, and (4) damages." On the general subject much has
been written. 2 An attempt will be made in this note to determine the
nature of the broker's agreement with an owner of property who has
listed it with him, and the application of the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye
to interference with such an agreement.
The difficulties attendant upon the application of the doctrine of
Lumley v. Gye become much more complex when we step into the
field of liability for interference with business relationships which have
not yet reached the contract stage. These may be of two kinds: (i)
those growing out of the good will developed between the tradesman
and his customers or an employer and his employees through an established course of dealing, and (2) those growing out of negotiations for
an isolated contract between parties who have had no regular course
of dealing. That the law does not confine its protection solely to contract rights is dear. It also assures to a man the right to enjoy the
fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, skill and credit. While one
has no right to be free from competition, he will be protected from
malicious and wanton interference by unlawful means.' Whereas in
the contract field it has been suggested that "promised advantages" are
being protected, Justice Holmes has aptly called unlawful interference
with one's established business not resting on contract "deprivation of
a man's ccustom.' "314
It has been said that the protection accorded the tradesman originated with the case of Keeble v. Hickerngill. 5 In that case the de6oi (1871), or because of uncertainty, Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, io 5 N. J. L. 345, 144
A. 715 (i929), or for similar reasons. The defendant ordinarily cannot put the
unenforceability in defense, nor can he answer that the contract as between the parties
to it is unenforceable because within the statute of frauds, on the theory that the
statute is for the benefit of the parties to the contract only. Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Ore.
455, 244 P. 509 (1926); Ex parte Banks, i85 Ala. 275, 64 So. 74 (I913); Rice
v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 8z (1876); 27 C. J. 307 (1922).
11 Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract," 36 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1923);
84 A. L. R. 43-52 (933).
12 3 ELLIOT, CONTn cTs, § 2685 et seq. (1913) ; Carpenter, "Interference with
Contractual Relations," 41 HARv. L. REv. 728 (1928); 39 HAv. L. REv. 518
(i926); 17 CORN. L. Q. 509 (1932); HARPER, TORTS, § 234 (1933). Cases involving justification for inducing breach are collected in 84 A. L. R. 43 at 79 (1933);
and see Carpenter, op. cit. at p. 745 et seq.
18 Martell v. White, I85 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085 (19o4); Auburn Draying
Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. I, 124 N. E. 97 (I919); Virtue v. Creamery Package
Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N. W. 930, 1136 (1913); 3 ELLIOT, CONTRACTS,
§ 269! (1913).

" May v. Wood, 172 Mass. ii, 51 N. E. 191 (1898).
15

I East. 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (18o9).
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fendant was held liable for having frightened away wild ducks which
the plaintiff had lured to his pond, so that he could shoot them for
commercial purposes. It was held that an action would lie for violent
or malicious interference with one's business, although one has no
right to be free from ordinary trade competition. Also in that case
the malicious act was prompted by spite and ill-will towards the
plaintiff and it was directed at the plaintiff himself, with resulting
injury to his business. Today, however, malicious acts of fraud, deceit
or molestation are actionable even if directed against third persons with
whom the plaintiff has established a course of dealing, because while
the acts are practiced on third persons, the injury is to the business 9 f
the plaintiff." Even though he has no binding contract with them,
the good will which he has developed through a course of dealing
with them assures him of their patronage. He has present and prospective economic advantages which are open to lawful competition
only. The competition is lawful only so long as the purpose of the
defendant is justifiable and so long as he does not employ means of
fraud and deception. 7 The social ends sought to be served by free competition are desirable, providing the means employed to gain those
ends are desirable. Moreover, in order to be justifiable, competition
must be exercised for the benefit of the competitor. The nature and the
intent behind the acts of competition, and not their effect, are controlling. Thus in a leading English case, a competing steamship company offered rebates to its customers in order to completely ruin
plaintiff's business. Bowen, L. J., said: "
"Assume that what is done is intentional, and that it is calculated
to do harm to others. ... Was it done with or without 'just cause
or excuse'? If it was bona fide done in the use of a man's own
property, in the exercise of a man's own trade, such legal justification would... exist not the less because what was done might seem
... to be selfish or unreasonable. ... But such legal justification

would not exist when the act was merely done with the intention
of causing temporal harm, without reference to one's own lawful
gain, or the lawful enjoyment of one's own right."
18

Grismore, cAre Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a

Competitor?"

33 MicH. L. REv. 3zI (1935).

"Where a violent or malicious act is

done to a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood, there an action
lies in all cases." Carrington v. Taylor, ii East. 571 at 576, 103 Eng. Rep. IX6
(1809).
7

ToRTs, § 234 (i33); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (871);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. McConnell, (C. C. Tenn. 1897) 82 F. 65; Brennan v.
United Hatters of America, 73 N. J. L. 729, 65 A. 165 (x9o6).
18 Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598 at 618 (1889),
affd. [1892 ] A. C. 25.
3. HARPER,
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Hence, an intent solely to spite and ruin plaintiff's business does not
fall within the privilege of competition."9 Also, one must be a competitor in the plaintiff's line of business to enjoy the privilege."0
3.

Differences obviously exist between the fact situation in the case
involving interference with established business custom and that in
which a man is negotiating for an isolated sale or other type of contract. In the former case, the plaintiff has an established good will
resulting from a course of dealing with his employees or with a
clientele of customers who regularly patronize his business. His prospective economic advantages in the form of future contracts are fairly
predictable and certain. Therefore, the courts are not speculating when
they give him relief against a defendant who has maliciously interfered with his business. On the other hand, the man who is negotiating
for the sale of property, or for a particular contract, in an isolated
instance is not so certain of success. In the early stages of his efforts it
is not so certain that damage has been caused him if a rival gets the
business, since it is by no means certain he would have succeeded had
there been no interference by this defendant. But if the plaintiff has
so far advanced in his negotiations that it can be said that but for the
fraudulent acts of the defendant he would have completed the contract,
the situation comes very close to that of interference with established
business custom. Whether protection shall now be accorded him, either
under the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, or under that of Keeble v. Hick-

eringill, is the problem which confronts us.
A tendency to expand the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye in this direction first appeared in Lord Esher's famous dictum in Temperton v.
Russell" in which he said:
"It seems rather a fine distinction to say that, where a defendant
maliciously induces a person not to carry out a contract . . . it

is actionable, but where he injures the plaintiff by maliciously
preventing a person from entering into a contract ...

which he

would otherwise have entered into, it is not actionable."
Five years later Lord Herschel stated that whereas Lord Esher saw
no distinction between the two situations, he thought there was a
"chasm between them."" Fairly settled precedent today makes such
interference actionable.
"9 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, Ii9 N. W. 946 (i9o9); Jones v.Leslie,
61 Wash. 107, 1iz P. 8i (1910).
20 Carpenter, "Interference with Contract Relations," 41 HARv. L. REv. 728
(1978); Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., i5z Iowa 618, 13z N. W. 371 (i9II).
21 [18931 I Q. B. 715 at 728.
22
Allen v.Flood, [1898] A. C. i at 2zi.
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In the early American case of Lewis v. Bloede," it was found that
the plaintiff would have entered into a contract for a supply of raw
materials with the United States government had it not been for the
fraudulent acts of the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff by
virtue of his negotiations had acquired "a status... which, but for the
defendant's interference, would have resulted in its making the contract" and that this status would be protected from the unlawful
interference by the defendant. The court went on to say that a sufficient cause of action was stated, the distinction between it and Lumley
v. Gye being the necessity for the plaintiff to show that he was not
only "about to, but would, but for the malicious interference of defendants, have entered into the contract.""' The more recent case of
Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, and others, are to the same
effect. 5
From these cases it appears that once the plaintiff arrives at a point
in his negotiations with a third party approximating the situation of
the established business custom cases he is entitled to relief. The
uncertainty of success which existed at the early stages of the transaction is now removed. In this situation it is more certain that the
plaintiff, if not wrongfully interfered with, will have promised advantages in the form of a contract than it is in the business custom
cases; and it is this certainty which the courts are striving to protect,
for mere fraud without damage is not actionable. In fact, it can be
said that under the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye and that of Keeble v.
Hickeringill, as well as in our pre-contractual situation, the same thing
is being protected, namely, the certainty of profits and earnings which
will be the plaintiff's but for the fraudulent acts of the defendant.
Only the degree of certainty differs in the three situations. There need
be no hesitation about protecting this pre-contractual status, for it is
difficult, logically, to give protection in the other two situations and
to deny it here. That which is sought to be protected exists in all three.
Nor will it unduly restrict competition, for until the preferred precontractual status is reached, competition for the business is open to
everyone. Competition, while socially desirable under our economic
system, must be carried on fairly. Fraud and deceit give the perpetrator an unfair advantage which may benefit himself but will harm
?o2 F. 7. Quotations at p. 17.
1ii4(I9OO), was cited, which in turn
16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 2d ed.,
cited Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871), not exactly in point.
25 23z App. Div. 591, 251 N. Y. S. 153 (i93i); accord, Skene v. Carayanis,
1O3 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497 (1926); Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro, 23 Cal. App. 427, 138
P. 364 (1913). The principle was recognized in Brooks v. Patterson, 234 Ky. 757,
29 S. W. (2d) z6 (193o), although the facts were not within it. See NiMs, UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS, 3 d ed., § 176 (1929).
23

24

(C. C. A. 4th, 19i1)
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society in general in the long run. Consequently the pre-contractual
status of the negotiator has properly been given a preferred status.2"
4.
Exactly where the so-called real estate broker's "contract" falls
within the doctrines enumerated and when recovery will be allowed in
a situation like that in the principal case are by no means settled questions. Before the problem can be solved it is necessary to determine
the nature of the relationship between the broker and the owner of the
property. Is it a contract of employment, or a mere offer to pay a
commission? Is the interference by the defendant directed against or
between the broker and the owner, or between the broker and the
prospective purchaser? The results will depend largely upon the
answers to these questions. The cases have used all the terms but have
thrown little light on the nature of the relationship. The results have
varied accordingly.
Usually, one who wishes to sell his property merely lists it with
one or several real estate brokers. Their understanding as to when the
commissions shall be earned depends largely upon any number of
conditions which they may stipulate. In the ordinary case, however, no
contract of employment is created at the time of listing. The broker
makes no binding promises; the owner promises to pay the commissions
if and when the broker finds a purchaser who is ready, willing and
able to buy. Moreover, the owner himself usually retains the right
to sell. In other words in the normal case the listing amounts to no
more than an offer for a unilateral contract, by the owner, which the
broker may turn into a binding contract by the performance of the acts
stipulated." That the owner may withdraw this offer at any time before
performance by the broker is clear. 8 Assuming the usual case then,
when has there been performance by the broker? If that can be determined, it will be easy to answer the question whether a contract was
"about to be made," upon the answer to which will depend the liability
of the defendant. " Meechem says a contract is consummated (i) when
the broker has obtained from a proper person and delivered to the
owner a written contract of purchase or a written offer to purchase, or
26 3 ELLIOT, CONTRACTS, § 2691 (1913).
272

MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 2429 (i914); Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass.

477, 57 N.

E.

IOOO (19oo); Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497

(1926); 13 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 495 (1927). This statement does not cover the
comparatively rare situation of the exclusive sales contract. See 64 A. L. R. 395
(1929); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., § 2433 (1914), as to variations in agreements.
28Bemister v. Hedtler, 249 Mass. 40, 143 N. E. 818, 33 A. L. R. 579 at
581 (1924);
Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 A. 723 (1921).
29
Lewis v. Bloede, (C. C. A. 4 th, 1912) 202 F. 7; Union Car Advertising Co.
v. Collier, 232 App. Div. 591, 251 N. Y. S. 153 (1931).
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(2) when the broker has brought forward, or put the owner in communication with, a suitable person to whom the owner may sell in the
ordinary course of business."0
The unlawful interference by the defendant, which is now under
consideration, occurs at a point where the broker has interested a prospective purchaser. The exact point at which the defendant interfered,
the manner of interference, and the results usually follow the following
patterns:
(a) P, the broker, interests B, the prospective purchaser, to the
point of buying. Before the contract of purchase is consummated, D, a
rival broker, induces B to purchase through him. In Madden v. Shane,3
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals denied recovery either against B or
D, saying that no contract rights had arisen at any point in the negotiations interference with which could be actionable. Other Texas cases
also hold that unless a contract right exists, there is no stage in the
negotiations which merits legal protection. 2 These Texas cases are
somewhat out of line with those following in holding that nothing
short of contract rights will be protected.
(b) At the same stage of the negotiations as in (a), D fraudulently
informs the owner that he has a purchaser who is not connected with P.
In fact he induces the owner to sell to a dummy, who in turn conveys
to B, whom P had originally interested. In Skene v. Carayanis,s the
Connecticut court recognized that no contract had been formed,"4 but
also held that no allegation of an unlawful interference with an existing contract was necessary. Recovery was allowed against D and B on
the theory that P would have earned her commissions had it not been
for the acts of the defendant. Somewhat to the same effect is Krigbaum
v. Sbarbaro,,5 in which the defendants, by the use of intimidation and
molestations, induced the owner not to sell through P, and effected a
o

MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d

ed., § 24-31 (1914).

s1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 185 S. W. 908.
'2 Payne v. Gebhard, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 136 S. W. 1118; Roberts v. Clark,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907) 103 S. W. 417, in which the prospective purchaser made a
down payment with an option to withdraw, which defendant broker induced him to do,
and then purchase through him. The court said (at 418): "As Clark had the absolute
right to not complete the sale, neither plaintiff nor McGregor [owner] could question
his motives, nor the means which led or induced him so to act." Query, was this at
least not like unlawful interference with a contract terminable at will?
as 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497 (1926).
34 103 Conn. 7o8 at 713: "There was, then, no complete contractual relationship
existing between the plaintiff and the Carayanis brothers ... so that it cannot accurately
be said that their acts brought about a breach of any contract."
85 23 Cal. App. 427, 138 P. 364. (1913).
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sale to a dummy who purchased for B, who had agreed to purchase
from P.
(c) P interests B in the property to the point where B is willing
to buy. Then B and the owner of the property combine to deprive P
of his commission and deal directly with each other. In Louis Kamm,
38 P disclosed the name of the prospective purchaser, B,
Inc. v. Flink,
to the owner, who thereafter sold to B through another broker. Recovery was allowed. Although the court made vague statements about
unlawful interference with one's business, it held that a cause of action
had been stated, since P would have earned his commissions but for
the unlawful acts of the defendant owner.
(d) P interests B in the property. B does not make an offer to P,
but he desires the property. He is unwilling to pay the full purchase
price, which includes the broker's commissions, therefore he induces a
friend to buy directly from the owner, disclaiming all knowledge of P.
These, it will be recalled, are the very facts of the principal case,
Johnsonv. Gustafson. These facts differ from the three preceding situations in that B has not made an offer to buy. Hansberry v. Holloway "
and Ringler v. Ruby"8 are cases directly in point. In the Hansberry
case, B made an oral contract with P to buy, but later refused to perform. Three weeks later he purchased directly from the owner. Denying recovery against B, the Illinois court said,
"The parties were dealing at arm's length, as entire strangers.
No contractual relation existed between them. If plaintiff in error
[purchaser] saw fit to buy directly from Shafer [owner] he had a
right to do so." 3"
In the Ringler case, the Oregon court recognized the doctrine of
Skene v. Carayanis,' but denied recovery by P against B, whom P
had interested but who later fraudulently purchased directly from the
owner. The court held that there was insufficient evidence that P
would have earned his commissions had it not been for the acts of B.
The court inferred that P must prove he had or would have found a
purchaser other than B. It accorded him no status for having sufficiently
interested B himself in the property to the point where B resorted to
fraud to obtain it.
In the principal case of Johnson v. Gustafson," the Minnesota
court reviewed the history of Lumley v. Gye, and went on to say that
as113 N. J. L. 582,

175 A. 6z (I934).
87 33z IlM. 334, 163 N. E. 662 (1928).
38 117 Ore. 455, 244 P. 509 (1926).

3" 332 IL. 334 at 338.
40 103 Conn. 7o8, I3I A. 497 (1926).
4 201 Minn. 629, 277 N. W. 252 (938).
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the law extends its protection still further, protecting one in the lawful
pursuit of his business. But at this point the difficulty present in all these
cases was encountered-the realization that there was no contract right,
nor established business custom, to protect under the old doctrines. The
court held that a cause of action was stated because plaintiff would have
earned her commissions had it not been for the fraudulent acts of the
defendant. But it went further and said that plaintiff was deprived, by
the fraud, of "her opportunity to pursue to the end her negotiations
for the sale of this property." 42
It is well to ponder the difficulty which confronts the court in this
particular situation. In the usual case, under the doctrine of Lvmley
v. Gye and the business custom cases, there are three parties involved.
The third party interferes with contract relations, present or prospective, between two others. The same is true in the ordinary precontractual case; the defendant, a third party, unlawfully interferes at
the very moment when the contract is about to be created. In the broker
case, the contract sought to be consummated is one between the broker
and the owner, for it is through such a contract that the broker will
earn his commission, if at all. If the defendant who interferes at this
point is a rival broker, the situation does not differ materially from
the pre-contractual cases already considered. But when the defendant
is himself the prospective purchaser there is more difficulty. The negotiations between the purchaser and the broker give rise to a precontractual status between the broker and the owner, and the very
acts of the purchaser prevent the formation of this contract. In the
principal case, the court held the broker would have earned her commissions but for the fraudulent acts of the purchaser, whom the broker
had originally interested in the property. This must mean that the
purchaser would otherwise have purchased through the broker, which
would have created a contract between the broker and the owner for
the commissions. If it does not mean that, there can be no recovery
under the theory of Lewis v. Bloede.4' The court went on to say that
the purchaser's acts prevented the broker from pursuing the negotiations for the sale of the property. This was a parting statement which
aptly shows the confusion which the courts find in the fact situation.
If this last statement must be relied on for recovery, it is certainly
anomalous, for the fraud of the purchaser did not prevent an almost
certain sale to some other prospect; that point was not involved in the
case at all. Unless there be such another prospect, the only injury
the purchaser caused the broker is that he would himself have purchased through the broker if in his own mind he had not conceived of
the scheme to defraud him.
Ibid., 201 Minn. at 634.
48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912) 202 F. 7.
42
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5.
In effect, the court is dealing with reprehensible conduct on the
part of the defendant, whether he be a rival broker or the prospective
purchaser. If a rival broker interferes, the situation presents little
difficulty, for it may easily be found that his acts prevented the certain
formation of the contract for the commission between the plaintiff and
the owner, by having prevented the consummation of the pending
sale by the plaintiff. But if the prospective purchaser himself perpetrates the fraud, it must be said that after the plaintiff has interested
him in the property to the point where he is willing to resort to fraud
to obtain it, he would have purchased from the plaintiff but for his own
acts of fraud. In giving relief, the court is also concerned with the
reprehensible nature of trade rivalry. While refusing to admit a cause
of action based upon unfair competition,"" the court recognizes that a
point is reached in the broker's negotiations for the sale of the property
which in fairness entitles him to protection from the unscrupulous and
fraudulent acts of a ruthless competitor. The Minnesota court is willing
to go further and protect him from the fraudulent and deceitful act
of the prospect he has interested. Protection of one's right in his contract or his business custom in effect is protection of economic advantages which have been successfully wrested from the field of competition. The negotiator who is so near having wrested his economic advantages that only fraud can deprive him of them is in the same
position.
It is submitted that the Minnesota court arrived at a proper conclusion. It recognized that in a field hitherto somewhat neglected, the
fair laws of trade, inherent in a civilized society, must be maintained. Those courts which deny recovery in such cases because of the
lack of contract element have failed to penetrate the problem sufficiently, for fear that competition will be unduly restricted. But that
need not be the result. The proof required, that the contract would
have been completely made but for the fraud of the defendant, is by
no means an easy outlet for those not properly within the circle of
protection. By recognizing this preferred status of the negotiator,
society will benefit equally as much as it will from wholesome competition. It will tend to keep the pursuit of gain on a level of decency
and fairness without sacrificing the benefits of competition."'
Anthony L. Dividio
"Grismore,

"Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a

Competitor?" 33 MicH. L. REv. 3Z1 (1935).

4' It will be noted that these actions sound in tort, and do not involve the equally

complicated question of when the broker has earned his commissions from the owner.
Nor does the right of action depend on the absence of the right against the owner

for commissions.

